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THE LIMITS OF COMPULSORY PROFESSIONALISM:
HOW THE UNIFIED BAR HARMS THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
BRADLEY A. SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION
"If lawyers, the vindicators of justice, cannot protect their own right
of private judgment, surely they cannot preserve their commitment
to advocate for the First Amendment rights of others. '
T he unified bar2-where lawyers must join the state bar association
as a precondition to obtaining and maintaining a license to prac-
tice law-is a system of organization unique to lawyers. No other pro-
fession is organized, or has ever seriously considered organizing itself,
along similar lines.3
Though states routinely license a wide variety of occupations and
professions, and often require the payment of an annual licensing fee
by those practicing within the profession, forced membership in an
association is unknown outside the bar. Doctors are not required to
join the medical society, nor dentists the dental association. Certified
public accountants, veterinarians, and architects are free to join, or
refrain from joining, their respective professional organizations. The
same is true with other licensed professions and occupations. 4
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the continued utility and
viability of the unified bar in light of modern developments in bar
association activities, state regulation of attorneys, and the 1989 deci-
* Assistant Professor, Capital University Law School; B.A. 1980, Kalamazoo College;
J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Professors Michael Distelhorst and Gary
Wolfram for their comments on an earlier draft.
1. Popejoy v. N.M. Bd. of Bar Comm'rs, 831 F. Supp. 814 (D.N.M. 1993).
2. The unified bar was originally referred to as the "integrated" bar, and is on occasion
still referred to as such. See, e.g., DAYTON D. McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR (1963). As the
term "integration" is now almost uniformly associated with racial or ethnic mixing, see Michael
Reisman, The Integrated Bar Project, YALE L. REPORT (Spring 1993) (discussing.elimination of
apartheid in the legal profession in South Africa), I have chosen to eschew the term "integrated"
bar, in favor of the more modern term, "unified."
3. Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unfied Bar Concept: Generalizing from
the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RtS. J. 1, 2.
4. See id. at n.3.
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sion of the United States Supreme Court in Keller v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia. The article begins with a brief history of the bar unification
movement and the theoretical underpinnings of mandatory bar mem-
bership. This permits a review of the arguments traditionally raised in
favor of mandatory bar membership and establishes a baseline against
which to measure the success of unified bars in achieving these objec-
tives. Next follows a review of the history of legal challenges to the
unified bar and, more particularly, the legal constraints within which
unified bar associations must operate in order to comply with the
Keller decision.' Finally, the article reviews the effects of these legal
constraints on the unified bar and the future viability of the unified
bar.
The Article concludes that if there ever were any advantages to the
unified bar, those advantages no longer exist. There is no evidence to
suggest that the public is better served in unified bar states, or that
lawyers in unified states are any more competent or ethical than their
counterparts in voluntary bar states. To the contrary, voluntary bar
states have been at the forefront of consumer oriented legal reform.
At the same time, the unified bar hamstrings the profession's legiti-
mate participation in public policy debates. Far from "unifying" the
profession, in unified bar states forced membership in the state bar
association is itself one of the most divisive issues in the profession.7
Further, the very nature of the unified bar is inconsistent with the role
of lawyers as the champions of individual rights. Both lawyers, and
the public at large, would benefit from the abolition of the unified bar
concept in favor of voluntary bar associations.
5. 496 UV.S. 1 (1990).
6. This legal analysis is limited to what is necessary to understand the evolving legal status
of the unified bar and the predicament unified bar associations face after Keller. Readers inter-
ested in a detailed discussion and critique of the cases leading up to and including Keller decision
itself should refer to Edwin J. Lukas, Note: Constitutional Law, 68 U. DET. L. REv. 297 (1991);
Christopher Yost, Belly Up to the Bar: Your Bar Tab is Compelled Membership and Mandatory
Fees, 20 PAC. L. J. 1281 (1989); Larry J. Rector, Compelled Financial Support of a Bar Associa-
tion and the Attorney's First Amendment Rights: A Theoretical Analysis, 66 NEB. L. REv. 762
(1987); and Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., The Integrated Bar and the Freedom of Nonassociation-
Continuing Seige, 63 NEa. L. REv. 30 (1984).
7. Indeed, the very term "unified bar" is misleading. A better term would be "compulsory
bar," because the alternative to the unified bar is not referred to as the "divided bar," but as the
"voluntary bar." The fundamental question is not whether the bar should be "unified," but
whether there are benefits to society, or the profession, from coerced membership in the bar,
and if so, whether such benefits outweigh the intrusions on the First Amendment rights of law-
yers not to associate with the organized bar.
For a sampling of the unification debate, see, e.g., Steven Levine, Time to Move to a Vol-
untary Bar, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 213 (1990); Wes Smith, Shootout at the Unified Bars, B. LEADER,
Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 11; Marcia M. McBrien, Debate Continues: Mandatory or Voluntary Bar for
Michigan, MicH. L. WKLY., April 5, 1993, at 3; and Schneyer, supra note 3, at 1-4.
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I[. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNIFIED BAR
A. Unifying the Bar
More so than other professions, lawyers were slow to join profes-
sional organizations. By 1929, 65% of the country's physicians were
members of the American Medical Association,' while only 18%o of
lawyers had joined the American Bar Association by 1930.9 During
the same decade, all but two state medical societies boasted member-
ship rates in excess of 5001o of the state's doctors, whereas three-
fourths of state bar associations had membership rates below 30%.10
Unable to attract more than a small percentage of lawyers to volun-
tary associations, some bar leaders naturally began to dream of the
benefits of forced membership. The most important early booster of
the unified bar was the founder of the American Judicature Society,
Herbert Harley." Harley argued that lawyers were slow to organize
because differences in the organization and subject matter of their
work prevented lawyers from recognizing their common interests., 2
Harley was not shy in suggesting that these common interests included
the economic benefits that could flow to lawyers from unification. He
believed that a unified bar could fix prices to help make "tongue and
buckle meet,"' 3 and that the voluntary bar was unable to meet the
self-interests of lawyers.14
Following Harley's lead, early proponents of the unified bar em-
phasized the benefits of unification to lawyers' self-interests. They ar-
gued that a unified bar would benefit lawyers by increasing the
membership and financial resources of the bar association; attracting
a more diverse membership to the association; setting minimum fee
schedules; eliminating control of bar associations by small cliques; al-
lowing for self- government and self-discipline of the bar; eliminating
"free riders;" and allowing lawyers to speak with "one voice" and to
8. Schneyer, supra note 3. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Rector, supra note 6, at 767.
12. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 9. Schneyer notes that Harley was "almost certainly wrong,"
both because physicians were at least as fragmented as lawyers, and because voluntary bar asso-
ciations today routinely claim 75% membership rates, although the bar is as fragmented today as
ever. Id. at 9-10.
13. This is a classic midwestern, turn-of-the-century phrase for the achievement of prosper-
ity. It refers to hitching a horse to a wagon, not to buckling trousers.
14. Herbert Harley, A Lawyer's Trust, 29 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 50 (1945).
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monitor legislation."' Their mouths watering at the prospect of greater
membership, finances, and influence, voluntary bar leaders lobbied
hard for integration. 16
However, supporters of unification were not so crass as to argue
merely from the self-interest of lawyers, because this was hardly a ba-
sis for formulating public policy. Furthermore, the very reason unifi-
cation was desired was because so few lawyers seemed to agree that
joining the bar association was in their self-interest. Also, supporters
of mandatory membership truly believe that a unified bar would yield
significant public benefits and serve the private interests of the bar.
The unified bar, they argued, would benefit the public through im-
proved professional standards; more effective discipline; a unified
voice of expertise on legal issues; and more effective fulfillment of the
public obligations of the bar, such as increasing the availability of le-
gal services.
7
Despite heavy opposition, the proponents of unification met with
considerable success. By 1940, the bar was unified in twenty states,
and by 1982, thirty-one states had unified their bar associations. 8
Generally, unification was done through state supreme court rulemak-
ing, as legislative efforts were blocked by opposition from both inside
and outside the profession. 19
Early advocates assumed that even though many lawyers resisted
unification, such opposition would cease once a unified bar was estab-
lished and became the norm. 20 Instead, opposition to unification has
grown more embittered and legal challenges more frequent over the
last two decades.2" The difficulty in resolving the debate stems from
fundamental disagreement about the nature of the unified bar.
B. Three Visions of the Unified Bar
Early proponents of the unified bar gave little thought to the nature
of the organization that they were creating. Would it be a state
agency, a private association, or something in between?
The debate over the merits, morality, and constitutionality of the
unified bar has been heavily influenced by three distinct, and often
conflicting, visions of the bar: the bar as private association; the bar
as a state agency; and the bar as a professional union.12
15. See Rector, supra note 6, at 769, and Sorenson, supra note 6, at 36-37.
16. Sorenson, supra note 6, at 35-36.
17. Id. at 36; see also Rector, supra note 6, at 768, and sources cited therein.
18. Sorenson, supra note 6, at 35.
19. Id.
20. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 3.
21. Id.
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The common historical vision of the unified bar was that of a pri-
vate association, operating no differently from the voluntary bar asso-
ciations that existed in most states before unification. From 1920
through 1950, when most state bars underwent unification, it seems to
have been the unquestioned assumption of leaders of the unification
movement that the bar would continue to function as a private associ-
ation, despite invoking the coercive power of the state to force mem-
bership and extract dues from reluctant colleagues.2 3
Bar leaders in unified states have generally operated their associa-
tions in the same manner as voluntary bars, offering member benefit
programs such as insurance and car rental discounts, a member's
magazine, and an active lobby aimed at legislation affecting the asso-
ciation's members.2" Unified bars have jealously guarded their inde-
pendence by resisting legislative or judicial encroachments into the
bar's internal and external operations.
When convenient, leaders of the unified bar have often been quick
to invoke a second vision of the unified bar, that of a public agency.25
In this vision, the unified bar is a state agency, essentially no different
from the state board of education or any other agency, except that its
officers are elected by a singular class (lawyers) who pay a special tax
(dues) to support the agency's operations. The ostensible purpose of
the agency is to regulate the legal profession and serve the legislature
as a resource for information and advice on legal issues. 26 Unlike the
private association model, this model necessarily implies significant
oversight of bar operations and budgets by elected politicians, and ac-
countability to the public.
In accordance with the public agency model, unified state bars have
in recent years been under pressure to add lay persons to their govern-
ing boards. 27 Such moves, when successful, may hinder the unified
bar's ability to look after its members' direct interests.2 Even when
states have not required the presence of "public" representatives on
the unified bar's governing body, the trend has been for increased in-
terference in state bar affairs by state supreme courts and legisla-
tures.
29
competing views. For readers interested in an excellent detailed discussion of the three models,
and the policy implications which flow from each, see Schneyer, supra note 3, at 47-79. The
brief description which follows draws substantially from Professor Schneyer's account.
23. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 46.
24. Id. at 74-75, 97.
25. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1025-29 (Cal. 1989); Falk v. State
Bar of Mich., 305 N.W.2d 201, 214 (Mich. 1981) [hereinafter Falk I] ("The State Bar responds
that ... [it] is rather a 'public body corporate' that operates as a public or state agency.").
26. See, e.g., Falk! , 305 N.W.2d at 228 (Williams, J., concurring).
27. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 68-72.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 72-75. For example, the Michigan State Bar has found its role in the management
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Increased oversight has not generally been welcomed by unified
bars, which correctly view closer legislative and judicial oversight as
limiting their autonomy.30 To members of the bar seeking to preserve
their institutional independence, the ultimate danger of the public
agency model is the creation of a compulsory bar not controlled by
lawyers.3 Therefore, although unified bar leaders have frequently in-
voked the state agency model to advance the bar's immediate inter-
ests, or to quash threats to the bar's mandatory status (usually from a
dissident lawyer who challenges the state's right to force membership
in the association as a condition of practice), once the immediate need
or threat has passed, the unified bar reverts to the vision of itself as a
private association.32
Between these two visions of a unified bar lies yet a third view,
which sees the unified bar as analogous to a public employees' labor
union." In this view, the state bar exists to serve its members, who
prefer self-regulation to state regulation. Membership is mandated to
prevent the "free rider" problem, where some lawyers benefit from
the services of the bar, but avoid paying for those services. However,
because membership is coerced, the state must periodically intervene
to protect the rights of dissenting bar members from abuse by the ma-
jority of the organization.34 This conception of the unified bar creates
public policy ramifications different from either the private associa-
tion or state agency conceptions; ramifications which are explored
more fully in the sections that follow.
and budgeting of the Attorney Grievance Commission and Attorney Discipline Board cut back
substantially by the Michigan Supreme Court, to the point where the Bar has asked to withdraw
from the process completely. Michael Franck, Crisis and Opportunity Confront the State Bar, 72
MICH. B.J. 272 (1993).
30. See Franck, supra note 29, at 273-75.
31. Such an organization existed in Louisiana under Governor Huey Long in the 1930s.
There, lawyers were forced to join a unified bar with a governing board elected by the public and
not explicitly limited to lawyers. A more conventional unified bar was established after Long's
death. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 44.
32. Comlpare the position of the Michigan State Bar in Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 305
N.W.2d at 214 (Falk 1) ("The State Bar responds that... [it] is rather a 'public body corporate'
that operates as a public or state agency."), with, quite literally, any issue of the Michigan Bar
Journal and most pronouncements of Michigan State Bar leaders, which routinely refer to the
bar as an "organization" rather than an "agency," lawyers as "members," and the membership
fee as "dues" rather than a "tax" or "licensing" fee. The Michigan State Bar maintains a
"Membership Services Department," and provides such "services" to members as a regular
journal and member benefit programs such as insurance and discounts. As one commentator has
noted, these are "the stockC in trade of private associations." Schneyer, supra note 3, at 75.
Meetings of the State Bar's Representative Assembly are riddled with references to "protecting
the profession" and "speaking for the membership" in the legislature. See, e.g., Marcia Mc-
Brien, Representative Assembly Approves Dues Bifurcation, Establishes 1994 Bar Dues: Identity
of Bar at Issue, MICH. L. WKLY., May 3, 1993, at 1.
33. Sorenson, supra note 6, at 54-55.
34. Id. at 54-56.
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These conflicting visions of the unified bar-private association,
state agency, and union-have created great confusion about the
rights of stdtes to force membership, the authority of unified bars to
engage in various activities, especially political activities, and the
rights of dissenting lawyers to withhold dues from the bar. Perhaps
inexorably, or perhaps because the primary players are lawyers, these
issues have regularly ended up in court." Unfortunately, the same
conflict of visions that confused the issue in the political arena exists
in the courts, hindering efforts to answer these questions.
III. THE UNIFIED BAR IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Lathrop: The Unified Bar Upheld
In the 1956 case of Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson,3 6 the Su-
preme Court, ruling on the constitutionality of a union shop provision
in a collective bargaining agreement, stated casually, "[o]n the present
record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First
Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by
state law is required to be a member of an integrated [unified] bar."37
However, far from precluding challenges to the unified bar, the
Court's casual pronouncement on the constitutionality of the unified
bar, a question which was not before it, marked the beginning of
more than thirty years of legal wrangling over the constitutionality of
the unified bar?
35. See, e.g., Gibson v. The Fla. Bar, 798 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1986); Arrow v. Dow, 636
F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1981); Levine v. Supreme Court of Wis., 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis.
1988); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 565 F. Supp. 963 (D.P.R. 1983),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Romany v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 742 F.2d 32
(1st Cir. 1984); Reynolds v. State Bar of Mont., 660 P.2d 581 (Mont. 1983); Falk v. State Bar of
Mich., 342 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1983) [hereinafter Falk 1I; Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 305
N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1981) (Falk I); Sams v. Olah, 169 S.E.2d 790 (Ga. 1969).
36. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
37. Id. at 238.
38. Constitutional issues surrounding the unified bar had arisen in some state court deci-
sions before Hanson. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Collins, 59 So. 2d 351 (Miss. 1952). An
interesting case is Petition for Rule of Court Activating, Integrating & Unifying the State Bar of
Tenn., 282 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1955), in which the State Bar of Tennessee argued that a legisla-
tive statute prohibiting a unified bar violated the state constitution because it infringed on the
state supreme court's power. The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to order unification after a
poll showed a substantial majority of the state's lawyers opposed unification. Today Tennessee
remains a voluntary bar, with a substantial majority of the state's lawyers as members.
Schneyer, supra note 3, at 10.
UNIFIED BARS
Only five years after Hanson, the Supreme Court recognized that
the issue was more complex than it first appeared. In Lathrop v.
Donohue9, Trayton L. Lathrop, a Wisconsin attorney, argued that
his compelled membership and financial support of the State Bar of
Wisconsin, which engaged in various political and legislative activities
with which Lathrop disagreed, violated his rights under the First
Amendment.40
Lathrop split the Court into no fewer than five camps. Writing for
the four-justice plurality, Justice Brennan found that mandatory
membership in a unified bar was constitutional, but that certain politi-
cal and legislative expenses of such an organization might violate First
Amendment rights of free speech. 41 However, as the record did not
reveal any particular political or legislative activities which Lathrop
alleged violated his rights, the plurality reserved the question.42
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frankfurter, concurred in the
judgment, but would have found that the State Bar of Wisconsin's use
of compulsory bar dues to promote legislative goals, regardless of the
issues prompting such activities, was not prohibited by the First
Amendment.4 1 Justice Whittaker concurred only in the result, being of
the opinion that, whatever its activities, a mandatory bar did not even
raise First Amendment issues." In essence, the three concurring jus-
tices adopted a public agency view of the bar .4
In dissent, Justice Black wrote that the State Bar of Wisconsin's use
of compulsory dues for political purposes violated Lathrop's First
Amendment rights of free speech." Although Justice Black and the
plurality disagreed on whether or not the case was ripe for decision on
all issues, both Justice Black and the plurality seemed to adopt the
vision of the unified bar as something akin to a public employees'
union. Though membership could be compelled, according to Justice
Black, forced dues could not be used in support of ideological causes
opposed by members . 7
39. 367 U.S. 820(1961).
40. Id. Lathrop wrote to the treasurer of the State Bar, "I do not like to be coerced to
support an organization which is authorized and directed to engage in political and propaganda
activities .... " Id. at 822. Neither the Supreme Court's opinion nor that of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court indicated the nature of the legislative activities and positions to which Lathrop
objected. His dues were $15 for the year. Id.; Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404,406 (1960).
41. 367 U.S. at 844-48.
42. Id. at 847-48.
43. Id. at 848. Harlan found Lathrop's arguments "specious." Id. at 865 (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
44. Id. at 865 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 861-64 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 865.
47. Id. at 871 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Also dissenting was Justice Douglas, who did Justice Black one bet-
ter by arguing that any compulsory membership in a state bar associa-
tion violated the First Amendment right of free association.4 In
Justice Douglas' unspoken vision, the unified bar was best compared
to a private association, and forced membership violated the First
Amendment.4 9
Despite the fractured nature of the Lathrop opinions, eight of the
Court's members, all save Justice Douglas, agreed that some level of
compulsory membership was constitutional. The other question posed
by Lathrop-what limits does the First Amendment place on the ex-
penditure of compulsory dues income-was left for another day.50 It
would be more than thirty years before that day arrived in the Su-
preme Court. 51
B. Keller v. State Bar of California-The Supreme Court Sets a
Standard
In Keller v. State Bar of California,52 the Supreme Court finally re-
turned to the issues left unresolved since Lathrop.
In Keller, members of the unified State Bar of California argued
that use of their mandatory membership dues to finance ideological
and political activities which they opposed violated their First Amend-
ment rights. Among the activities the plaintiffs challenged were bar
association lobbying for or against legislation changing the gift tax to
exclude gifts made to pay for education tuition or medical care, creat-
ing criminal sanctions for violation of laws pertaining to the display
for sale of drug paraphernalia, and requesting Congress to refrain
from enacting a guest-worker program for alien labor; filing amicus
curiae briefs in cases involving the constitutionality of a victim's bill
of rights, disqualifying a law firm from a case, and concerning the
power of a workers' compensation board to discipline attorneys; and
adopting resolutions on issues such as gun control, a nuclear weapons
freeze, and federal court jurisdiction over abortion, public school
prayer, and busing for school integration.53
The plaintiff's argument hung primarily on a post-Lathrop United
States Supreme Court labor law decision, A bood v. Detroit Board of
48. Id. at 877 (Douglas J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 877-78.
50. Id. at 865-66 (Black, J., dissenting).
51. In the interim, the issue percolated in lower courts. See supra note 35 for a partial
listing of cases.
52. 496 U.S. 1 (1989).
53. Id. at 4, 5-6 n.2.
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Education.14 In A bood, the Detroit Board of Education reached a col-
lective bargaining agreement with the local teachers' union implement-
ing an 'agency shop' arrangement. Under this agreement, teachers
who chose not to join the union were nevertheless required to pay a
union "service fee" as a condition of employment.5 The plaintiffs,
Detroit public school teachers, objected that their compelled dues
were used to fund ideological and political lobbying for causes unre-
lated to collective bargaining and repugnant to their beliefs.56 The Su-
preme Court held that the Board of Education, as an arm of the state,
could not compel individual teachers to pay dues to support ideologi-
cal activities unrelated to collective bargaining, and that the plaintiff
was entitled to a pro rata refund of dues spent on such activities.57
In Keller v. State Bar of California", the California Supreme Court
rejected the labor union vision of the State Bar, instead ruling that the
State Bar Association was a state agency, and upheld the use of man-
datory dues for all such activities. 9 The United States Supreme Court
reversed. 60
The Keller Court began with a perfunctory statement affirming
that, "lawyers admitted to practice in the State may be required to
join and pay dues to the State Bar .... ,,61 However, the Court went
on to hold that a unified bar could not use mandatory dues to engage
in the full range of activities that might be open to a state agency.62 In
rejecting the state agency vision of the unified bar, the Court found
that, "[t]he State Bar of California is a good deal different from most
other entities that would be regarded in common parlance as 'govern-
mental agencies."' 63 It noted that the Bar's revenues came not from
legislative appropriations, but from dues income; that only lawyers
were members; and that the Bar did not ultimately have the power to
admit anyone to the practice of law, nor to disbar or suspend an at-
torney, nor to establish codes of conduct." It was not created, the
Court noted, to participate in the general government of the state, and
54. 431 U.S. 209 (1971).
55. 431 U.S. at 212.
56. Id. at 213-14.
57. Id. at 233-42. It would be several years before the Supreme Court specified minimum
standards and procedures by which a union in such a situation could meet its obligations to
refund dues pursuant to Abood. Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
58. 767 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1989).
59. Id.
60. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
61. Keller, 496 U.S. at 4.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id.
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its members and officers were not selected because they were citizens
or voters, but because of their status as attorneys. 6
Rather than viewing the unified bar as a state agency, the Court
saw, "a substantial analogy between the relationship of the State Bar
and its members . . . .and the relationship of employee unions and
their members . . . ." Borrowing from the holding of Abood, the
Court held that mandatory dues could not be used for activities not
"germane" to the purpose for which compelled association was justi-
fied. 67 In the case of the unified bar, the Court found compelled asso-
ciation justified only by the State's interest in regulating the legal
profession and improving the quality of legal services. Only if chal-
lenged expenditures were "necessarily or reasonably incurred" for
those limited purposes could mandatory dues fund them.6s
The Court admitted that the line between permissible and impermis-
sible expenditures of mandatory dues would be murky, but shrugged
off any need to provide clear guidance by pointing out that, "the ex-
treme ends of the spectrum are clear." 69 Mandatory dues could not be
spent lobbying on issues such as gun control or a nuclear weapons
freeze; they could be spent for activities connected with attorney disci-
pline and ethical codes. 70 The Court then held that a unified bar asso-
ciation would have to develop some procedure to assure that it would
not spend mandatory dues income on impermissible activities. 71
Finally, the Court concluded by specifically leaving one important
issue open. In addition to contesting the expenditure of mandatory
dues income, the Keller plaintiffs also had argued that any political or
legislative activity by the state bar violated their First Amendment
rights. According to the plaintiffs, the compelled nature of their mem-
bership in the Bar meant that all political and legislative
activity opposed by the plaintiffs and carried out in the name of the
State Bar of California violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
to free association, including the right of disassociation, regardless
of the source of funding. 72 The Court declined to address
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 13-14.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 15-16.
71. Id. at 16-17.
72. Id. at 17. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment protects
the right not to be associated with certain beliefs. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding flag salute by public school children cannot be compelled); Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (requiring individual to display motto, "Live Free or Die," on
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this argument. 3
Keller was, at best, a Pyrrhic victory for the unified bar. First, by
not addressing the issue of whether the unified bar can lobby under its
own name on any issue opposed by even one member, the Court left
the unified bar open to future constitutional attack. Second, although
Keller upheld the concept of the unified bar, it rejected both the pri-
vate association vision of the unified bar, favored by the bar for ad-
ministrative purposes, and the public agency vision of the bar, used by
the bar to protect itself from internal dissent. By adopting the profes-
sional union vision of the bar, the Court required unified state bar
associations to develop mechanisms to determine the amount of dues
spent on activities for which dues could not be extracted involuntarily,
and to allow dissenting members to deduct that amount from their
dues.7 4 The result, although not immediately apparent, was to provide
unification opponents with the tools needed to render the unified bar
unworkable at an acceptable cost. This result first became clear in the
State Bar of Michigan in 1992.
IV. CoPING WITH KELLER
A. Voting with Their Wallets: The State Bar of Michigan Experience
with Dues Deductions
After Keller, unified state bar associations began to develop proce-
dures by which members could claim dues deductions for Keller-pro-
hibited lobbying. The State Bar of Michigan, fresh off a major legal
battle of its own over its constitutional status, 75 filed an amicus brief
supporting the State Bar of California in Keller.7 6 After Keller, the
Michigan Bar became one of the first unified bar associations to im-
plement a system for dues deductions, and to make members aware of
this deduction option.
license plate violated right to refrain from speaking).
This right has been recognized, however, only where the individual is in some way compelled
to positively voice the objectionable viewpoint. Still, it is hard to see how anyone would think
that the driver of a car supports the slogan the state places on his license plate any more than a
lawyer supports the positions of the unified state bar of which she is a member. Indeed, as many
citizens do not realize that state bar membership is mandatory, but know that a state auto license
plate is required, it seems more likely that people would mistake membership in the bar for
support of the bar's positions. Forced association through compulsory bar membership, there-
fore, seems the more intrusive of the two. See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 877-85
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
73. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
74. Id. at 16-17.
75. Falk v. State Bar of Mich,, 305 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1981) (Falk 1); Falk v. State Bar of
Mich., 342 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1983) (Folk II).
76. 496 U.S. at 4, n.*
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In 1991, the first year in which the State Bar of Michigan allowed
dissenting members to deduct dues pursuant to the Keller decision,
twenty-four percent of the Bar's members exercised this right. 77 In
1992, the State Bar of Michigan conducted a major campaign to per-
suade members not to exercise their right to deduct dues, yet 22% of
members took the deduction. 78 In 1993, the percentage leaped to
48% .79 In other words, by 1993, nearly half of Michigan's lawyers
were disassociating themselves from positions taken by the State Bar. 0
Furthermore, although the available evidence is largely anecdotal,
there is reason to believe that as members learned more about the Mi-
chigan State Bar's lobbying and ideological activity, they became
more likely to request a dues deduction. As then State Bar of Michi-
gan Vice-President Jon Muth stated, "the more information we gave,
the higher the rate of deductions." 8'
Dissatisfaction with the political and legislative activities of the uni-
fied bar also was reflected in a non-scientific, mail poll conducted by
Michigan Lawyers Weekly in early 1993. The poll results showed that
sixty-nine percent of those responding favored a voluntary bar over
the mandatory Bar.82 The primary reason stated for this preference
was not resentment of dues, but opposition to the Bar's ideological
advocacy. One lawyer responding to the survey attacked the state Bar
as, "shill[ing] for plaintiffs." Others wrote that the Bar "does not
represent the consensus of its members"; that it was "dominated by
77. Franck, supra note 29, at 277. The State Bar actually allowed members either to deduct
the amount spent for impermissible lobbying from their dues, or to divert that amount to the
Michigan State Bar Foundation, a non-profit foundation started by the Bar some years previous.
In 1991, 40o of the members chose the diversion option. Two percent chose to divert dues in
1992, and 7% in 1993. The remainder of those who objected to the Bar's lobbying activities
simply deducted the amount from their total dues. In 1993, the amount of the Keller deduction
was $15, or 7.5% of total Bar dues. Id. at 276.
78. Id. at 277.
79. Id.
80. A review of legislative positions taken by the State Bar of Michigan in 1991-92 and the
first quarter of 1993 showed nothing that might be construed as particularly radical or unrelated
to the law. The bar did not, for example, take positions orr any general tax or spending measure,
welfare reform, abortion, or national issues. Legislative Report, 72 MIC. B. J. 242 (1993). The
only issue that stands out is that of opposition to the death penalty, which the Michigan State
Constitution already prohibits.
Other unified state bar associations have not suffered the wholesale defections that Michigan
has. It this respect, Michigan may have been victimized by its own good faith efforts to comply
with Keller. Nevertheless, the potential for mass defection exists in other states.
81. Marcia M. McBrien, Representative Assembly Puts an End to Keller Lobbying Activity
by State Bar, MIci. L. WKLY., June 28, 1993, at 3.
82. Marcia M. McBrien, Poll Respondents Express Dissatisfaction With Bar, MICH. L.
WKLY., Apr. 19, 1993, at 1.
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the Negligence section and other special interests"; and that it does
not "strive to present a balanced recitation of facts or law to the is-
sues." Complained one member, "I am embarrassed at the positions
the state bar takes." 83 While one should avoid placing too much em-
phasis on a relatively small and self-selected sample, the mail poll sup-
ports the conclusion that a significant reason for the steady increase in
dues deductions was dissatisfaction with the State Bar of Michigan
politics and programs, and not a desire to save the $15 portion of dues
supposedly earmarked to lobbying and political activity.
Nevertheless, State Bar of Michigan leaders attempted to defend the
Bar's activities. Writing in the Michigan Bar Journal, Executive Direc-
tor Michael Franck argued that while,
"a significant number of members object generally to our lobbying
and other ideological activities .... [t]he available data also
suggests, [sic] however, that a significant rationale for exercising the
deduction/diversion option is simply a desire to reduce the amount
which must be paid to retain active membership in the State Bar of
Michigan."
Franck also deplored the practice adopted by some employers of limi-
ting their payments of dues on behalf of their attorney employees to
the amount for which mandatory dues could be collected under
Keller, leaving it to the individual attorney to pay the optional portion
of the dues. Franck argued that such employers were converting First
Amendment rights into "a business opportunity." 8 1 Franck's view
that economics, rather than ideology, was the driving force behind in-
creased dues deductions, almost certainly applies to some attorneys
claiming the dues deduction. However, the complaint seems mis-
guided. For example, the emphasis on the refusal of some employers
to pay the full dues for their attorneys misses a basic point about the
dues: it is perfectly permissible for individual attorneys who support
the Bar's activities to pay the political portion of the dues directly. 6
The fact that those lawyers were unwilling to pay even the $15 deduct-
83. Id.
84. Franck, supra note 29, at 276. In fact, Franck cites no data to support his argument.
85. Id.
86. As Christopher DeWitt, a spokesperson for the Michigan Attorney General's Office,
says, "If our attorneys want to pay the legislative portion, that's their choice." Marcia M. Mc-
Brien, Bar Commissioners to Ask for End to Keller Lobbying, MICH. L. WKLY., Mar. 8, 1993,
at 1. The employer's goal, after all, is merely to protect itself by assuring that its attorney em-
ployees are properly licensed to practice.
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ible portion of the dues indicates that those lawyers did not support
the Bar's ideological activities."'
By the spring of 1993 it was clear that the Michigan State Bar was
careening towards crisis. Half of the Bar's members were "voting,"
through the dues deduction option, not to support the bar's legislative
activities. Even if many members were deducting dues for economic
rather than ideological reasons, the number was an embarrassment to
the State Bar of Michigan and its leadership, for it indicated that
members did not feel that the Bar's activities were worthy of financial
support at the existing dues rate. Changes had to be made, lest the Bar
find itself with a majority of its members on record as disassociating
themselves from the official legislative positions of the Bar. s8
What the State Bar of Michigan's good faith implementation of
Keller had done was provide a mechanism to bring disagreement
within the Bar to the fore. No longer need any lawyer compromise his
beliefs to maintain a license to practice, or, as would be the case in a
voluntary organization, to continue to take advantage of other mem-
ber benefits. Keller provided an easy out that, quite naturally, mem-
bers used. After considering the Bar's options, the Board of
Commissioners decided to abandon most of the lobbying field by
adopting an approach first pioneered by Florida's unified bar associa-
tion.89
B. The Florida Solution
In 1984, the Florida Bar Association, a unified bar, took a public
position against a state ballot initiative to limit state spending. This
prompted a lawsuit challenging the Bar's use of compulsory dues for
such ideological activity. 9° Taking the position later adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Keller,9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Gibson v. The Florida Bar
that while the Bar could lobby for any purpose, it could not use the
involuntary dues of dissenting members to support ideological activity
unrelated to the administration of justice. 92
87. Nor should we assume that all who paid the full dues amount necessarily support the
bar's legislative program. Certainly some attorneys may pay the full amount by accident, from a
sense of general obligation to the bar, from habit, from lack of knowledge about the deduction
option, or because the bill was routinely paid by a secretary, clerk, or spouse.
88. See supra text notes 81-87.
89. McBrien, supra note 86, at 1.
90. Gibson v. The Fla. Bar, 798 F.2d 1564 (1lth Cir. 1986).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 59-70.
92. Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1569-70.
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Further litigation then arose over the procedure the Florida Bar
adopted to comply with the court's ruling, with dissenting members
claiming the right to an advance dues deduction, and the Bar arguing
that it was only required to calculate and rebate dues spent on ideo-
logical activity after the fact. 9 Nine months after deciding Keller, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Gibson.94
Before the case was heard, however, the Florida Supreme Court is-
sued an order limiting the Florida Bar's lobbying activities to five ar-
eas:
(1) the regulation and discipline of attorneys; (2) matters relating to
the improvement of the functioning of the courts, judicial efficacy
and efficiency; (3) increasing the availability of legal services to
society; (4) regulation of attorneys' client trust fund accounts; and
(5) the education, ethics, competence, integrity and regulation of the
legal profession. 95
As a result, the Florida Bar argued that it could not legally engage in
any activities which could not be supported by mandatory dues.
Therefore, it followed that no mechanism for advance dues deduc-
tions was necessary. 96 The United States Supreme Court dismissed the
writ of certiorari as "improvidently granted. "97
In March of 1993, the State Bar of Michigan Board of Commission-
ers, following the Florida example, recommended to the Representa-
tive Assembly that the Bar discontinue all so-called "Keller"
activities. 9 Under this proposal, the Bar would no longer engage in
ideological activity that could require a Keller dues deduction. Those
opposed to adopting the Florida solution generally argued that the
Bar's involvement in a broader legislative agenda was important to the
public and to lawyers. Former State Bar President Donald Reisig ar-
gued, "Why-when we as a profession are threatened-would we get
out of the legislative business?"" Reisig went on to argue that if other
members chose to exercise their Keller deduction, "I'll gladly carry
my fellow lawyers' load."100
93. Gibson v. The Fla. Bar, 906 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 499 U.S. 918 and
cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 633 (1991).
94. Gibson v. Fla. Bar, 499 U.S. 918 (1991).
95. The Fla. Bar re Schwarz, 552 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951
(1990).
96. Franck, supra note 29, at 278.
97. Gibson v. The Fla. Bar, 112 S. Ct. 633 (1991).
98. McBrien, supra note 86.
99. Edward Wesoloski, Key 'Keller' Proposal Tabled by Representative Assembly; Special
June 19th Session Called to Deal With Unfinished Business, MICH. L. WKLY., May 3, 1993, at i.
100. Id.
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Against these arguments, those favoring the Florida solution-in-
cluding most of the Bar's leadership-argued that the Bar could not
continue with just 52% of its members supporting its legislative activi-
ties.' 0' The only alternative to the Florida solution, they argued, was a
voluntary bar, which, said one officer, "would really eviscerate the
state bar."' 0 2 Said another, "[a]t stake is the continued existence of
this organization." 0 3 In light of the existence of active voluntary bars
in nineteen states, however, including the neighboring states of Min-
nesota, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, such doomsday predictions ap-
pear extravagant. Yet those opposed to adopting the Florida solution
never seriously promoted the obvious alternative-a voluntary bar.
From the start, the most vocal supporters of continued Keller lobby-
ing assumed, as did their opponents, that the unified bar must con-
tinue, and that a voluntary bar would spell disaster. 101
In the end, "an overwhelming majority" of the Michigan State Bar
Representative Assembly approved the proposal to abandon Keller
lobbying and to seek an order from the Michigan Supreme Court es-
sentially identical to that obtained by the Florida Bar, specifically pro-
hibiting the State Bar of Michigan from engaging in Keller-prohibited
lobbying.0 5 On July 30, 1993, the Michigan Supreme Court issued the
requested order,106 and the state Bar embarked on a new era of limited
legislative activity and, it hoped, peace with its dissenting members.
V. Is THE FLORIDA SOLUTION A WORKABLE ANSWER?
On the surface, the Florida solution adopted by the Michigan and
Florida bars solves the administrative difficulties posed by Keller and
eliminates confrontation over the legal and ideological divisions
within bar associations. On closer inspection, however, the Florida so-
lution strips state bars of their ability to undertake many activities vol-
untary bars perform in other states, and does little to resolve the
problems inherent in the unified bar concept as magnified by the
Keller decision.
The first problem with the Florida solution is that it shifts, but does
not eliminate, the locus of questions concerning the political activities
101. McBrien,supra note 81.
102. Id. (quoting State Bar Vice President Jon Muth).
103. Id. (quoting State Bar President-Elect Michael Dettmer).
104. See id. (comments of Jerome O'Connor); see also McBrien, supra note 32; Wesoloski,
supra note 99.
105. McBrien, supra note 81, at 3.
106. State Bar of Mich. Activities, Admin. Order 1993-5 (Mich. 1993).
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of the bar and the rights of dissenting members. As in Florida, the
Michigan Supreme Court order limits the Michigan Bar's legislative
activity to those "reasonably related to" five different areas:
1) the regulation and discipline of attorneys; (2) matters relating to
the improvement of the functioning of the courts, judicial efficacy
and efficiency; (3) increasing the availability of legal services to
society; (4) regulation of attorney trust accounts; and; (5) the
education, ethics, competence, integrity and regulation of the legal
profession? °0
Additionally, compulsory dues may be used to provide "content- neu-
tral" assistance to legislators. 101
The problem is that none of these terms is self-defining. It may be
easy, for example, to say that a unified bar operating under this rule
could not take a stand, pro or con, on proposed rent control legisla-
tion. However, suppose that the bar adopted a position supporting a
proposal to provide free legal representation to tenants in eviction
proceedings or other landlord-tenant disputes. On the surface, this
would fall within the third criterion listed above, "increasing the
availability of legal services." Yet, many bar members may staunchly
oppose such a position. Some would argue that it would encourage
marginal or frivolous suits by tenants and thus raise the overall cost of
housing to poor people. Others may object that this is a wasteful and
inefficient use of societal resources, because the added legal services
may provide less benefit to society than spending the money on a dif-
ferent program, or simply reducing spending. 09
In evaluating the effectiveness of the unified bar after Keller, the
merits of any particular proposal are inconsequential. The point is
that taking a position on such an issue would be expected to create an
ideological debate every bit as real as the bar taking a position on a
"substantive" issue such as rent control itself. The fact that the issue
is arguably related to expanding the availability of legal services
hardly responds to the complaints of dissenting members that they are
being forced to subsidize ideological activities they oppose. Thus, dis-
senting members still may challenge the bar's activities as going be-
yond the permissible scope of lobbying activity. Some arbitration
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Jonathan R. Macy, Not All Pro Bono Work Helps the Poor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30,
1992 at A7.
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procedure will be needed to address these challenges, and to rebate
dues to prevailing complainants.
In fact, this is exactly what has happened in Florida. Although the
Florida Bar theoretically engages in no Keller-prohibited lobbying, it
still maintains a dues rebate procedure through which members can
challenge activities of the Bar as falling outside the bounds of Keller-
permissible activity."'0
To date, the number of objectors in Florida has been relatively
small."' This seems to reflect the fact that the Florida Bar now takes
relatively few public positions to comply with its restrictions on lobby-
ing,"12 the rather paltry size of the rebate," 3 and the fact that the ob-
jector must request a rebate in writing within forty-five days of the
publication of the Bar's position.' 4 Presumably, other states follow-
ing this approach also will have fewer Keller deductions than other-
wise, but the need for a rebate procedure, and the possibility of
further litigation, will not go away.
Moreover, any assumption that the number of challenges will re-
main small may be erroneous, and could depend on many factors.
The most important factors affecting the number of challenges are the
extent to which unified bar associations refrain from taking political
or legislative positions, and the determination of dissenting members
to stand their ground and demand dues rebates.
A unified bar adopting the Florida solution would speak out on far
fewer issues, including relatively innocuous issues on which it would
seem to have obvious technical expertise. For example, during the
1991-92 session of the Michigan legislature, the State Bar of Michigan
took positions on fifty-eight pieces of legislation." 5 If Michigan's cur-
rent rule had been in place for that session, the Bar undoubtedly
would have acted on far fewer issues. Among the issues which proba-
bly would not have qualified for lobbying under the Florida solution
would be bills providing for readability of consumer contracts, limi-
ting tort immunity for volunteers of non-profit corporations, allowing
corporations to be represented by persons other than attorneys for
parking violations, increasing the maximum recovery in small claims
110. FIA. BAR R. 2-9.3(c).
11. A total of 44 members objected to Florida Bar positions between Sept. 1, 1992 and
Aug. 31, 1993. Memorandum from Paul F. Hill, General Counsel to the Florida Bar, to the
Board of Governors of the Florida Bar (Sept. 1, 1993) (on file with the author).
112. The Florida Bar took only 14 legislative positions between the summers of 1992 and
1993. Id.
113. Id. The dues rebate in 1993 was $8.52 plus interest.
114. FLA. BAR R. 2-9.3(c).
115. Legislative Report, 72 MIcH. B.J. 242 (1993).
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court, and revising the burden of proof in cases in which insanity is
plead as a defense.116 This self-imposed censorship is not beneficial to
either the bar or the public.
However, despite the scaled back legislative program the new rule
requires, one issue that would probably have remained a permissible
target of lobbying in Michigan would have been a proposal to adopt
the "English Rule" of requiring the losing party in a civil lawsuit to
pay the winning party's legal fees. The Bar could justify involvement
in the matter under the rubric of expanding the availability of legal
services, and possibly as a matter pertaining to the efficiency of the
courts and the integrity of the profession." 7 Yet any position taken by
the Bar on this issue, pro or con, could be legitimately challenged as
being beyond the boundaries of Keller. Adoption of the English Rule
was a favorite notion of former Vice President Dan Quayle and has
been hotly debated not only in legal journals, but also on editorial
pages."' Should a significant number of dissenters challenge a posi-
tion of the Bar on such an issue, the Bar would be forced to continue
to refund dues to large numbers of its members, or to engage in an
expensive arbitration, possibly followed by further litigation, which it
might very well lose.
No matter how much the legislative program of the unified bar is
reduced in scope, it is hard to imagine any issue which might not be
challenged by dissenting members of the bar as being an impermissible
subject for lobbying with mandatory dues. For example, Rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to dismiss a
civil lawsuit without prejudice only if done before the defendant's fil-
ing an answer, which must normally be done within twenty days of
filing the complaint. Some state court systems, however, allow a
plaintiff to dismiss a suit without prejudice virtually up until the time
of trial. 1" 9 Reform of a state rule to match the federal rule would seem
to be precisely the type of narrow, technical issue on which the bar
116. Letter from Michael J. Karwoski, Ass't Exec. Dir. for Programs and Governmental
Relations of the State Bar of Mich., to author, July 19, 1993 (on file with the author). These
conclusions represent Mr. Karwoski's personal opinions and do not mean the Bar might not
have taken a position on some or all of these issues, or that the Bar's Board of Commissioners
or Representative Assembly would have agreed that they were permissible subjects for lobbying.
117. Id. Again, this represents Mr. Karwoski's personal opinion, with which the author gen-
erally agrees. However, that others might disagree exposes the difficulty of implementing the
Bar's new approach.
118. See, e.g., Bradley L. Smith, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules & Contingency Fees:
Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 2154 (1992); Dan Quayle, Civil fustice
Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992); Robert J. Samuelson, Go Ahead, Bash Lawyers, WASH.
POST, Apr. 22, 1992, at A21.
119. See, e.g., Omo R. Cry. P. 41.
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could expend mandatory dues to lobby. Surely it would seem to fall
within "improving the efficiency of the courts." Yet this issue would
be highly political, because the federal standard is generally viewed as
being more favorable to defendants, and the state standard more fa-
vorable to plaintiffs.
Similarly, the opening for providing the legislature with "content-
neutral" advice on legislation also provides no safe harbor for bar
lobbying. Any conclusion on the merits of legislation, for example,
would be prohibited unless the legislation could fit into one of the five
categories open for bar lobbying. As seen, this task is more compli-
cated than it first appears. Even a supposedly neutral listing of "ad-
vantages" and "disadvantages" of legislation could be challenged by
members who view the bar's analysis as one-sided. In the end, the Bar
would be able to do little more than point out technical errors of
draftsmanship-for example, incorrect citations to other statutory
provisions, or failure to specify available remedies. Whether this serv-
ice is much needed, in light of the legislative staff and other resources
already available to lawmakers, is debatable .120 The result of the Flor-
ida solution is that, on numerous issues, the entire bar is silenced to
protect the rights of a minority, and possibly a very small minority, of
members.
Furthermore, though a position taken by the bar might seem to fit
within the permissible scope of lobbying, the bar could not rest easy.
Although the Supreme Court in Keller found that no dues rebate was
needed for lobbying on matters related to improving the quality of
justice, logically it is hard to see why the law should compel a person
to fund an association's propagation of views with Which she or he
disagrees, merely because these views relate in some way to the quality
of justice and the person happens to be a lawyer. Apparently benign
proposals often involve significant philosophical disputes over the role
of states in our federal system of government, differing attitudes to-
wards various types of business activity, or divergent beliefs about the
economic effects and social wisdom of encouraging or discouraging
different types of legal claims. Faced with a specific case involving
such a "technical" issue, it would require no significant stretch for
the Supreme Court to expand upon Keller and hold that all lobbying
is impermissible if undertaken with compulsory dues. ' 2'
Legal reform issues simply do not break down as neatly as the col-
lective bargaining issues at stake in the Abood line of cases. Though
120. Sorenson, supra note 6. at 78.
121. Id.
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disagreement may exist over union goals, strategies, or tactics, it
seems relatively easy to decide whether an issue is concerned with
working conditions in a bargaining unit. The same is not true of legal
issues. As Justice Ryan noted in his opinion in Falk I:
We do not believe that for First Amendment purposes a distinction
can be drawn between legislation aimed at issues loosely termed
procedural, such as court reorganization and rules of evidence in
product liability actions and the like, and those termed substantive.
In either category of legislation, the choice of one approach over
another is necessarily premise-based and thus subject to contrary
opinion or belief.122
A minority determined to test the full extent of its rights could drag
the bar into extended arbitration and litigation over virtually every
piece of legislation supported or opposed by the bar.
The cost to the unified bar of gaining the rather illusory advantages
offered by the Florida solution is the unified bar's abandonment of
much of the legislative field on which bar members in voluntary bar
states remain eligible to play. Restricting lobbying activities to "non-
ideological" matters offers no safe harbor from dissident challenges.
At the same time, the restricted subject matter of permissible lobbying
forces the bar to remain silent on issues which significantly affect its
members, and on which its members might reasonably be expected to
offer particular knowledge or expertise to the public. For example,
under the Florida solution, the bar will no longer be able to lobby on
tort reform, even if a substantial majority of its members favor a par-
ticular position on proposed legislation. m' An organized bar also will
have to remain silent on issues such as national health care reform,
despite the tremendous impact which reform is expected to have on
the profession.2 4 The benefits allegedly gained by forcing lawyers to
join the bar hardly seem worth such a high price. And yet, even after
paying that high price, the unified bar under the Florida solution will
not escape the fundamental controversy which has dogged it for dec-
122. Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 305 N.W.2d 201, 218 (Mich. 1981) (Falk 1); see also Pope-
joy v. New Mexico Bd. of Bar Comm'rs, 831 F. Supp. 814, 815 (D.N.M. 1993) ("Plaintiffs'
concern [is] that Bar members are being compelled to subsidize political or ideological activity
disguised as being germane to the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the
quality of legal services.")
123. McBrien, supra note 86 (quoting Thomas C. Oren, Michigan State Bar Communica-
tions Director).
124. Rorie Sherman, Health Plan to Have Major Legal Impact, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 20, 1993,
at 1.
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ades-the conscription of thousands of lawyers who do not want to
join.
The result of the Florida solution to the Keller problem is that activ-
ities and effectiveness of unified bar associations will decline, but this
reduction in activity will not pacify many members who object to their
mandatory membership. 25 Yet the Florida solution was adopted, both
in Florida and in Michigan, precisely because the unified bar had be-
come unworkable in the wake of the Keller decision. In this situation,
the question is not simply whether a unified bar is constitutional, 26
but whether it serves any useful purpose that a voluntary association
would not.
VI. TiE VOLUNTARY ALTERNATIVE
The advantages of coercive membership in a state bar have always
been more rhetorical than real. When we compare the track record of
the unified bar to the arguments made on its behalf, both during the
heyday of the unification movement in the 1930s 27 and in the present,
unification appears to be a rather dismal failure. This section exam-
ines these arguments in turn.
A. Resources
Traditionally, unified bar supporters have stressed the program-
matic advantages a unified bar has over a voluntary organization. 21
Simply put, the argument is that the added resources of coerced dues
and membership enable the bar to do more in the way of pro bono
programs, legal education, and other programs to benefit lawyers and
the public. Actual experience has never supported this argument.
Coerced membership should not be expected to give the bar more
access to added human resources. Lawyers who do not wish to give
their time to the bar are unlikely to do so because they are forced to
125. See, e.g., Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 822 (quoting plaintiff Trayton Lathrop, "I do not like
to be coerced to support an organization .... "); McBrien, supra note 82 (quoting Michigan bar
member, "Lawyers should be allowed the right to choose whether or not to subscribe to mem-
bership in a state bar without the fear of being sanctioned! .... "); see also Patricia Heim, The
Case for a Voluntary Bar, Wis. LAW., Feb. 1991, at 10, 63. ("Although there is reason to believe
that a substantial number of the bar's members, perhaps a majority, oppose a mandatory bar in
principle, the 80-plus percent rate of membership in the voluntary bar ... indicates the willing-
ness of many members... to join a voluntary professional organization.").
126. See, e.g., McBrien, supra note 82 (quoting Thomas C. Oren, Communications Director
of the State Bar of Michigan, responding to one member's objection to the unified bar by argu-
ing that coerced membership was constitutionally valid under Keller.).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
128. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 97-103.
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join. Unless states and the courts are willing not only to force lawyers
to belong to the bar, but also to commandeer their participation in
bar functions and programs, there is no net gain in human resources.
In fact, the unified bar dissipates considerable human capital through
regular infighting among lawyers who do not want to be members of
the bar association and those who want to coerce their colleagues into
membership.
Nevertheless, the argument might be made that those members who
participate in bar programs will have greater financial resources owing
to the coerced dues taken in from other lawyers.'2 9 However, even dis-
counting the question of what percentage of the unified bar's income
is spent accommodating and fighting with fellow lawyers seeking to
exit the association, the dues issue is probably overstated. The under-
lying assumption of those who predict financial disaster for a de-uni-
fied bar is that membership in a voluntary bar would decline
precipitously, and that the bar would be unable to replace the lost
income. Empirical evidence does not support these assumptions. 30
Voluntary state bar associations have developed other sources of in-
come which have allowed them to reduce their reliance on dues in-
come to a figure well below that of the typical unified bar
association.' 3' Similarly, voluntary bars, through member benefit pro-
grams, have generally been able to maintain membership rates in ex-
cess of 70016 of the state's lawyers, with some having membership
greater than 90%.132
To use Michigan again as an example, if we conservatively assume
that a voluntary Michigan Bar retained only 70% of its members and
129. See Ron McCrea, Bar at Crossroads: Mandatory or Voluntary?, Wis. B. BUL., July
1988, at 11, 12.
130. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
131. For example, the State Bar of Michigan receives nearly 80% of its income from member
dues. State Bar of Michigan General Fund Statements of Revenues and Expenses, MICH. B.J.,
June 1993, at 618. In Ohio, dues account for approximately 5506 of the voluntary bar's income.
Dennis L. Ramey, Association Expands Member Services and Non-Dues Income, OHio LAW.,
May-June 1993, at 4. Other voluntary bar associations have relied on dues for as little as 3007o of
revenue. See, e.g., Heim, supra note 125, at 63. This was a decrease in the percentage of income
from dues in 1988, the last year of mandatory membership in Wisconsin before a court order
made the bar voluntary for a three year period. 1988 Annual Report of the State Bar of Wiscon-
sin, Wis. B. BuL., Nov. 1988, at 35.
132. The membership rate in Minnesota's voluntary state bar has recently been more than
90%, Irvin Charne, The Case for a Mandatory Bar, Wis. LAW., Feb. 1991 at 10,15; in Illinois it
typically runs 70% or more, Schneyer, supra note 3, at 10 n.49; Indiana's voluntary membership
was recently 87%, Marcia M. McBrien, Will Keller Spell End for an Integrated Michigan Bar?,
MIcs. L. WKLY., Mar. 22, 1993, at 1; Ohio's was 70%, Telephone Interview with Kate Hagan,
Ohio State Bar Ass'n (June 30, 1993); and Wisconsin retained 8507 membership when it
switched from a unified to a voluntary bar in 1988, John Walsh, Looking to The Future, Wis. B.
BUL., Dec. 1988, at 57.
1994]
60 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:35
continued to rely on dues for 70% of its income, the Bar would face a
budget cut of approximately 20076.1 In a more optimistic scenario, in
which the Bar garnered 80076 participation and reduced its reliance on
dues to 50% of income, the budget would be cut by only 10%. Of
course, the Bar would also no longer have to provide benefits to co-
erced members who would prefer not to have them, thus reducing
some costs. Facing the market discipline of voluntary membership,
other administrative savings might be found as well.3 4 Thus, it ap-
pears that conversion from a unified to a voluntary bar would result
in a modest decrease in income of 10-20%. However, a portion of this
decrease could realistically be offset by decreasing administrative costs
through market discipline; ending services to disinterested, coerced
members; ending infighting with dissenters; and by realizing adminis-
trative savings from ending Keller rebates to dissenting members.
This scenario may be unduly pessimistic, given the fund-raising ca-
pacity of unified versus voluntary bar associations. A 1983 study for
the American Bar Foundation by Professor Schneyer demonstrated
that voluntary bar associations are actually better able than unified
bars to raise money, and usually have a higher level of per-member
funding than mandatory bar states.' Schneyer hypothesized that the
superior fund-raising ability of voluntary bar associations might be
the result of a resistance to dues increases in unified bars by those
members who would prefer not to be members of the unified bar at
all. 3 6 It may also be caused by the different nature of the dues pay-
ment. Where dues are mandatory, lawyers may view the bar as a tax-
ing authority, to which the less paid the better. Lawyers, generally an
individualistic lot, may be more willing to support an increase in fees
to their voluntary professional organization than to a perceived taxing
authority. In a voluntary bar, members must think about the value of
membership and their own commitment to the profession. Thus, the
Ohio Bar has successfully attracted many members to pay an amount
133. This calculation is based on a 30% membership reduction times the percent of income
to come from dues, assumed at 70 07o. Thus the formula is 0.3 X 0.7 = 0.21. The author assumes
that the State Bar will continue to make fee services available to non-members, but does not
consider that the non-member fees may rise, creating added income.
134. A quick look at staffing ratios, for example, shows that the State Bar of Michigan has
approximately 671 members per staff person, while the voluntary Indiana and Ohio State Bar
Associations have 909 and 954 members, respectively. Denny L. Ramey, Comparatively Speak-
ing, Oo LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 4. Michigan is not particularly "fat" as state bar associa-
tions go; it has a higher ratio of members to staff than does Wisconsin's mandatory bar, or the
voluntary bars of Minnesota and Illinois. Id. The point is that it is a mistake to assume that
every dollar reduction in dues income will result in a dollar decrease in bar programs.
135. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 14-15.
136. Id.
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far in excess of regular dues to become "sustaining members"-a title
with nothing more than honorary significance. These lawyers pay be-
tween $60 and $225 extra per year in dues for this designation.
Thus, voluntary bars have proven their ability to attract and hold
members, and to increase nondues income. In doing so, they provide
themselves with resources at least equal to those of unified bar associ-
ations.
B. Programmatic Arguments
Even if the addition of involuntary dues income increases the re-
sources available to a unified bar, there is no evidence that these re-
sources translate into added benefits for either the public or bar
association members.
1. Public Benefits
As a constitutional matter, coercive bar membership has been justi-
fied on the basis of alleged public benefits accruing from a unified
bar. 37 Such benefits, in theory, take the form of better consumer pro-
tection and regulatory innovation, improved delivery of legal services,
including pro bono work, and better lawyer discipline. In fact, the
unified bar has been a disappointment in achieving any of these ends.
Schneyer, for example, found that states with unified bar associa-
tions have been slower than voluntary bar states to adopt regulatory
programs beneficial to consumers, such as client security funds.'38
Similarly, the country's first mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(CLE) program was adopted in 1974 by Minnesota, a voluntary bar
state.'3 9
Unified bars likewise have not demonstrated an edge over voluntary
bars in providing pro bono legal services or in increasing the availabi-
lity of legal services.'14 This is, perhaps, obvious: who could ever seri-
ously suggested that pro bono legal services for the poor and indigent
are more readily available in Michigan, with its mandatory bar, than
in Ohio or the other voluntary bar states surrounding Michigan? In
137. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 849 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
138. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 100.
139. Id. at 99 n.584. Iowa, another voluntary bar state, took initial steps to establish a man-
datory CLE requirement that same year. Id. One might argue that mandatory CLE is more
valuable in states where bar membership is not compulsory, on the theory that some mechanism
other than the bar is needed to assure continuing competence. However, defenders of the unified
bar have pointed to mandatory CLE as a benefit of unification, id. at 99, so it is worth pointing
out that voluntary bar states led the way in this development.
140. Id. at 101-03.
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Ohio and other voluntary states, local bar associations are particularly
active in providing pro bono legal services.' 41 Forcing all lawyers to
belong to the state bar may inhibit the development of voluntary, lo-
cal bar associations.1 2 If a mandatory bar hurts enrollment and the
level of financial support given to local bar associations, a unified bar
may stymie local pro bono efforts. Further, the compulsory nature of
dues in a unified bar may make even nondissident members view their
dues as a tax, relieving them in some way of their pro bono responsi-
bilities. Thus, a unified bar may actually stifle pro bono activity.
In the field of attorney discipline, unified bar associations may have
had some early positive impact. 14 Voluntary bar states, however, have
since made equal strides in self-policing.'" Regardless of any past ben-
efit that may have accrued from the unified bar, attorney discipline
can hardly serve as a justification for the unified bar today. By 1980,
only fourteen of thirty-three unified bar associations played any sig-
nificant role in enforcing attorney discipline. 4 Experience has shown
that the state can directly assume any role played by a unified bar
association with positive results. 16
Again, a ready comparison can be found between Michigan and
Ohio. Under the new State Bar of Michigan dues structure, lawyers
will pay $90 per year to the bar to fund attorney discipline.1 47 In Ohio,
a voluntary bar state, attorneys pay $50 per year-to the Ohio Su-
preme Court-to fund grievance and disciplinary activities. 148 There is
simply no reason a unified bar association must do these functions
and, in voluntary bar states such as Ohio, state agencies do them.
Not only can the state effectively assume direct regulatory responsi-
bility over attorney discipline, there are public policy reasons to prefer
that it do so. Perhaps the most important of these concerns is the
temptation for private groups vested with governmental regulatory
141. In the author's home of Columbus, Ohio, for example, the local bar association re-
cently launched an ambitious pro bono program, known as "Lawyers for Justice," to supple-
ment the government's hard-pressed legal aid program. Money for "Lawyers for Justice" came
from the local bar foundation. The foundation and bar also have given considerable support to
pro bono programs to help juvenile court volunteers, guardians, caseworkers, etc. Bloomfield
New Foundation President, DAnY RaP., Dec. 3, 1993, at 9.
142. Heim, supra note 125.
143. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 18-22.
144. Id. at 18-23.
145, Id. at 22.
146. Id. at 23-24.
147. Marcia McBrien, Keller and Bar Dues Proposals Approved by High Court; State Bar
Dues to be Set at $250 for 1993-94, MIcH. L. WKLY., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1.
148. Omo Gov. BAR R. VI, Sec. I(A) (Attorneys pay $100 biannually, which covers attorney
discipline and registration.)
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power to use that authority to stifle competition or dissent . 49 Placing
the public power to discipline attorneys into the hands of what is basi-
cally a private, autonomous organization is problematic, at best. On
one hand, members may seek to use the disciplinary process for anti-
competitive or other illegitimate reasons. At the other extreme, the
association may unreasonably seek to protect members from punish-
ment or exposure.
As a result of these conflicts, states have reasserted control over
regulation of the legal profession. As they have done so, unified bar
associations have found themselves at a disadvantage compared to
voluntary bar associations. In Michigan, for example, the State Bar
has been stripped of any meaningful role in attorney discipline. Yet
State Bar dues remain the primary source of funding for the Michigan
Attorney Grievance Commission & Attorney Discipline Board.5 0 Even
as these bodies rely on the Bar for funding, the Bar has lost the ability
to set the budget for these committees, which the Michigan Supreme
Court now determines.' 5' In other words, the state regulates attorney
discipline, then sends the bill to the State Bar of Michigan. Were law-
yers to create an attorney disciplinary system from scratch, it is hard
to believe that this would be their model.
From a standpoint of effective public regulation of the profession,
the unified bar poses a fundamental problem for states. Because the
unified bar operates as a private organization, invoking state power
primarily for coercing membership dues from other lawyers, it must
be regulated closely to prevent the abuse of delegated power. This
state oversight of the bar is conducted less for the broader public
good, however, than to protect the rights of dissenting lawyers
trapped in the unified bar. In a voluntary bar state, on the other
hand, the state can directly assume its proper regulatory functions
aimed at protecting the public interest. Voluntary bar associations are
then free to tend to the broader issues of improving professional stan-
dards, and to promoting voluntary pro bono, educational, and other
programs. In this way, the voluntary bar benefits from clear lines of
demarcation between state authority and private action, eliminating
any necessity for the state to intervene in the private operations of the
organization except when necessary for some higher public good.
149. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Em-
pirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981); Walter Gel-
horn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 6 (1976).
150. Franck, supra note 29, at 273.
151. Id.
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Thus, in the wake of Keller, the unified bar is less likely to serve the
public interest than the voluntary bar.
2. Private Benefits
In addition to public benefits, private benefits accruing to members
of the profession are often claimed for the unified bar. Once again,
these assertions are not supported by evidence.
The disadvantages of unification to the state bar associations
should now be apparent. Keller has added significant management
difficulties and may have made effective legislative activity impossi-
ble. The Florida solution, hailed as a remedy, merely doubles the
problem. By adopting the Florida solution, as the Michigan bar has,
state bar associations leave themselves with a smaller role in public
affairs than they would have if they simply complied with Keller. This
role is already less than that which could be played if the unified bar
chose, instead, to become a noncoercive association.15 2
Moreover, the Florida solution is not likely to stop the infighting
over the bar's activities and the compulsory membership of unwilling
attorneys. Bar associations adopting the Florida solution will face reg-
ular arbitrations against their own members, or continue to refund
dues to any lawyer making such a request.'53 To the extent that effi-
cient bar association administration and a strong legislative program
are beneficial to the private bar, unification is a handicap, not a
strength.
Proponents of bar unification continue to argue, as did their prede-
cessors, 5 4 that these administrative difficulties are offset by the bene-
fits of unification to lawyers. Such alleged benefits may include
insurance, discounts on both personal and professional products and
services, the inculcation of professional values, and greater diversity
in membership and opinion. Such private benefits are not usually con-
sidered a sufficient basis to invoke the coercive power of the state to
force individuals to join an organization.'55 However, even if they
were, it is not clear why coercion is necessary in the case of the bar.
Material private benefits such as insurance, credit cards, car rental
discounts, and other financial savings are prevalent in voluntary asso-
ciations.1 6 Indeed, voluntary associations may be more likely to offer
such benefits to attract members. Like its Michigan counterpart, for
152. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
155. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 97.
156. Id. at 98.
UNIFIED BARS
example, the voluntary Ohio State Bar Association provides its mem-
bers with access to insurance, discounts, continuing legal education
programs, and a periodic magazine-type publication. However, Ohio
State Bar members also receive a weekly magazine with updates on
legislation and the full text of newly reported state court opinions-a
service no unified bar in the country provides. The Ohio State Bar
carries on an active legislative program and a mentor program for
young lawyers. It assists lawyers with ethical or substance abuse prob-
lems and sponsors numerous public education programs. The Ohio
State Bar is able to do this despite a relatively low membership rate-
compared to other voluntary bar states-of approximately 70% of the
state's attorneys. The American Bar Association, and many local as-
sociations, also offer savings on various services to their members.
Thus, tangible financial benefits offered by unified bar associations
are insufficient, both in theory and in practice, to justify coercive
membership.
In addition to membership services offering tangible savings or
products, unified bar supporters often argue that there are intangible
advantages to the unified bar that justify its existence even if it pro-
vides no tangible programming benefits. Here, too, such advantages
seem illusory, at best.'57
One such claim is that a unified bar allows the profession to speak
with one voice."' In light of the long-term friction within the legal
community over the unified bar, and in particular its political activ-
ity, 119 this argument may turn reality on its head. The unified bar, in
fact, heightens the tensions within the profession and makes suspect
the level of membership support for every position asserted by the
bar. Where members cannot "vote with their feet," it is difficult for
lawmakers or the public to know the true level of support for the
bar's stated position.
At the same time, a unified bar can exaggerate the degree of dissen-
sion within the profession by assuring a fractured voice. This occurs
because, since Keller, a dissident attorney in a unified bar can request
a dues deduction at no cost. If a member disagrees with any position
of the bar strongly enough, that member can collect a rebate, even
though he or she may agree with a majority of the positions of the
bar. The dissident attorney need not give up benefits of bar member-
ship, nor the right to try to shape bar policy on other issues of con-
cern.
157. Id. at 104.
158. Sorenson, supra note 6, at 37.
159. See supra notes 7, 35; Smith, supra, note 7.
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In contrast, under a voluntary system, an attorney who disagrees
with a bar position must either pay the full dues, or leave the associa-
tion entirely, thereby forfeiting member benefits and the opportunity
to engage in further policy discussions on the issue in question, or on
other issues. This gives a member a strong incentive not to leave the
association because of disagreement over a few, or even all, positions
taken by the bar. The voluntary bar forces lawyers to concentrate en-
ergies on common interests, not disagreements, and presents the pub-
lic with a more unified voice. The unified bar, especially since Keller,
must first trim its remarks to meet the subject matter on which it is
authorized to spend mandatory dues, and then hope that its dissidents
won't undercut it by demanding rebates. The Florida solution does
not alleviate this problem, but exacerbates it. Under Keller, the bar's
public pronouncements are limited only if financed by mandatory
dues. The Florida solution, by limiting the bar to a narrow range of
subjects which purport to relate directly to the administration of jus-
tice, restricts the subject matter the bar may address with voluntary,
as well as mandatory, dues.
It has also been argued that unification is necessary to assure that
all lawyers are steeped in the tradition of the law and that lawyers'
professionalism is carefully nurtured throughout their careers.160 Pro-
ponents of unification rarely explain how this comes about. Presuma-
bly, they would argue that a unified bar can succeed where a
voluntary bar cannot because it can force "unprofessional" lawyers
to associate with unified bar activists, who theoretically represent the
highest professional standards. Professionalism, however, does not
come from being conscripted into an organization a lawyer would pre-
fer not to join.' 6' Resentment of the profession's norms, as deter-
mined by the unified bar, seems the more probable result. The unified
bar cannot force enthusiastic participation, and more likely invites
only sullen, involuntary association. Even if a bar is prepared to force
lawyers not just to join, but to participate in the bar, it is hard to see
how mandatory membership will raise professional standards.
Furthermore, the argument is based on an antiquated perception of
reality. When the unification movement began in earnest in the
1920's, thirty-two states had no formal educational requirements to
practice law. 162 As late as 1927, not a single state required attendance
at law school before being admitted to the bar. 163 Today, with few
160. Cf. Sorenson, supra note 6, at 36; Charne, supra note 132, at 12.
161. Heim, supra note 125, at 61.
162. LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM at
104 (Robert MacCrate ed., student ed. 1992) [hereinafter CONTINUUM).
163. Id.
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exceptions, lawyers in the United States must first pass through the
bonding experience of three years of law school before being allowed
to sit for a state bar examination.'" Lawyers must then pass a bar
examination and endure background investigations for character. 6
Many states require continuing legal education, including an ethics
component. Also, the large majority of lawyers in voluntary states be-
long to either their state association, a local association, or the Ameri-
can Bar Association.'" All attorneys are subject to the general
disciplinary authority of the courts. 67 Thus we find that lawyers are,
at the inception of their legal education and throughout their careers,
imbued with professional norms. Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, New
York or Illinois lawyers would hardly take seriously the assertion that
they are less professional because their states lack mandatory bar as-
sociations. Similarly, it is doubtful that many Michigan, Florida, or
California lawyers, including those in favor of a unified bar, would
feel that their own level of professionalism would be diminished if
they could no longer coerce their colleagues into the association.
In addition to raising standards of professionalism, it is sometimes
argued that the unified bar assures participation of women, minori-
ties, and rural attorneys in the bar.'" The notion seems to be that
either the leaders of the voluntary bar will discriminate against women
and minorities, or that women and minorities will not recognize the
benefits of bar membership and so, absent compulsion, will not join.
This seems ironic, as it is leaders of the bar themselves who offer this
as a rationale for unification. 69 One suspects that if discrimination is
164. Id. at 100; Roger C. Cramton, Partners in Crime: Law Schools and the Legal Profes-
sion, THE BAR EXAMINER, Nov. 1993 at 8. Only four states (California, Vermont, Virginia and
Washington) permit an individual to sit for the bar exam without some law school education.
These states require a corresponding time in law office study. Few students choose to go this
route. CONTINUUM, supra note 162, at 100. Maine, New York, and Wyoming permit a combina-
tion of law school and law office study. Again, few students choose this route. Id.
165. CONTINUUM, supra note 162, at 108.
166. For data on membership rates in voluntary bar states, see supra note 132. Additionally,
the American Bar Association includes 370,000, or roughly 4906 of the country's lawyers. David
M. Leonard, The American Bar Association: An Appearance of Propriety, 16 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y. 537, 558 (1993). Also, many lawyers belong to local bar associations and other
professional organizations such as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Presumably,
there is significant overlap in membership, but there must be some lawyers who belong to the
ABA, local bar associations, or other professional groups while not joining the voluntary state
bar association.
167. CONTINUUM, supra note 162, at 109.
168. McCrea, supra note 129, at 12; Charne, supra note 132; Sorenson, supra note 6, at 36-
37.
169. See, e.g., McCrea, supra note 129, at 12 (quoting Linda Balisle, a member of the Board
of Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin); Charne, supra note 132 (writing for a Committee
appointed by the State Bar of Wisconsin to argue for unification.).
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truly a concern of these leaders of the bar, there is little danger that
they will discriminate in the absence of unification. The argument that
women and minorities will not recognize the benefits of participating
in the bar hardly merits serious discussion. If the benefits of member-
ship exist, women and minorities will take advantage of them. If such
benefits do not exist, coercion is hardly justified.
Similarly, the premise that forced association with the bar will re-
sult in participation and a sense of inclusion for underrepresented
groups seems obviously incorrect. In fact, it seems more likely that the
opposite is true: a unified bar able to force under-represented groups
to pay membership dues has little incentive to develop programs or
sensitivity to the concerns of these groups. Voluntary bars, on the
other hand, must reach out to truly include such groups. The Ohio
State Bar Association, for example, recently completed a study of
women in the profession, devoting an entire issue of its members'
magazine to a report of the results. 0
In summary, there is no reason to believe that lawyers in unified bar
states benefit from their state associations in ways that lawyers in vol-
untary bar states do not. Nor are there any apparent public benefits.
Indeed, unified bar states seem to lag behind voluntary bar states in
protecting the public.' 7'
C. The Wisconsin Experience
Although there are no obvious benefits from unification, and sev-
eral handicaps, anyone asserting that the unified bar damages the pro-
fession must nevertheless deal with the Wisconsin experience.
Wisconsin recently returned to a unified bar system after a brief ex-
periment with a voluntary bar. For many, this is the Rosetta Stone
that demonstrates the superiority of the unified bar. 7 2 On closer ex-
amination, the Wisconsin experience shows no such thing.
After many years as a unified bar, Wisconsin, pursuant to a 1988
United States District Court ruling, dropped its mandatory bar mem-
bership requirement. 7 3 For four years, the Wisconsin bar functioned
170. Osno LAW., July-Aug. 1993. The Association has recently installed its first female pres-
ident, Kathy Burke.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
172. See, e.g., MeBrien, supra note 82 (quoting Thomas C. Oren, Communications Director
of the State Bar of Michigan, "The Wisconsin bar found that an integrated bar served the public
interest better than a voluntary bar. The superiority of the mandatory bar isn't merely conjec-
ture; it's supported by real-life experience.").
173. Levine v. Supreme Court of Wis., 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd sub nom.,
Levine v. Heffernan,'864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989).
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as a voluntary association. Keller, which affirmed the constitutionality
of a unified bar, provided that mandatory dues were not expended for
political activities unrelated to the administration of justice and the
legal profession, opened the way for reunification. After Keller the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, which had upheld the unified bar Against
frequent challenges before the 1988 federal court ruling, again condi-
tioned the practice of law on membership in the State Bar of Wiscon-
sin.
Though the request for a unification order came from the State
Bar, Wisconsin's experience with a voluntary bar should hardly be in-
terpreted, as many have attempted to do, as a failure. During four
years of voluntary operation, Wisconsin's bar membership remained
very high, in excess of 80%. " The bar moved much more aggressively
into the provision of CLE programs than it had in the past, reduced
its reliance on dues income, and remained financially sound. 75 There
was no reported increase in disciplinary actions or ethical violations.
When the Bar's leadership considered reunification after Keller, the
Bar's executive director opposed reunification. 176 No formal survey or
vote was taken of Wisconsin lawyers. At the time, membership was
running at approximately 80%, and it is fair to assume that the over-
whelming majority of those who had not joined the voluntary bar op-
posed reunification. Thus, even if Association members had favored
reunification by a 60 to 40% margin, the reunification would proba-
bly have been opposed by a majority of-the state's lawyers. In fact,
many observers believe that a majority of Wisconsin lawyers, espe-
cially younger lawyers, opposed reunification. In 1978, the State Bar
of Wisconsin had gone to court rather than allow its members to vote
on whether to remain a mandatory bar. 77 Despite the Board of Gov-
ernors' efforts, a referendum was taken. The vote was 2820 (or 59%)
against unification, to 1892 in favor of continued unification. 7, The
Board still refused to recommend the discontinuance of unification at
the time.
After Keller's pronouncement that a unified bar was constitutional,
the Board of Governors sought reintegration. Like the Board, the
174. Walsh, supra note 132, at 57.
175. Heim, supra note 125.
176. Telephone conference with Patricia Heim, Chair of the Special Committee to Recom-
mend a Voluntary Bar (Sept. 23, 1993).
177. State ex rel. Armstrong v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 273 N.W.2d 356 (Wis.
1979).
178. In re Discontinuation of State Bar, 286 N.W.2d 601, 602 (Wis. 1980).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court, which ruled on the petition to reintegrate
the bar, had long favored unification.179 It was, as one Bar member
and supporter of a voluntary bar stated, "always a foregone conclu-
sion that the Board would request and the Supreme Court would or-
der reunification."'' 10 Interestingly, a committee appointed by the Bar
to argue for reunification did not, in its report, cite a single program
or issue which had been rendered ineffective, reduced in scope, or dis-
continued by the court-ordered move from a unified to a voluntary
bar in 1988.181
Thus, the Wisconsin experience, though often misrepresented as
proof of the superiority of a unified bar,8 2 in fact shows just the op-
posite-the Wisconsin State Bar carried on quite successfully for four
years as a voluntary organization.8 3
Unified bars should be evaluated on their merits. Unless supporters
can point to real benefits, the intrusion on the rights of lawyers can-
not be justified. The fact that the Wisconsin Bar's Board of Gover-
nors and State Supreme Court were eager to return to coerced
membership does not represent a victory for the effectiveness of the
unified bar, but merely a political victory for those who favor unifica-
tion.
D. First Principles
Any discussion of the public and private benefits of unification is
necessarily carried on against a backdrop laden with premises. To
many supporters of the unified bar, unification raises no serious issues
of individual rights. In this line of thinking, it is enough that in Keller,
179. See, e.g., Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873
(1989); In re Discontinuation of State Bar, 286 N.W.2d 601 (Wis. 1980); Lathrop v. Donohue,
102 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1960); In re Integration of the Bar, 77 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1956).
180. Heim, supra note 176.
181. Charne, supra note 132. It is interesting to compare the Committee's report to the pred-
ictions made by unified bar supporters immediately after the court decision which temporarily
abolished the unified bar. The fears expressed at that time included huge membership losses,
massive dues increases, mass dropouts of minorities, women, and small town lawyers, and
sparsely attended programs. These fears did not apparently occur, but the Committee called for
reunification anyway, offering conclusory statements about the benefits of unification. See
McCrea, supra note 129.
182. See McBrien, supra note 132 (Becky Weiner, Public Relations Coordinator for the State
Bar of Wisconsin, said that the impetus for the Bar's move to voluntary status was the Keller
limitation on bar funding (in fact, it was the court order in Levine, 679 F. Supp, at 1502), and
implied that the decision to return to a unified bar was based on a member survey supporting
such a choice (it was not, supra text accompanying note 176)).
183. Heim, supra note 125; Levine, supra note 7; cf. Charne, supra note 132 (arguing for
reunification of the Wisconsin bar, but failing to cite a single program or tangible benefit which
was not maintained while the bar functioned voluntarily).
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the Supreme Court upheld the concept of mandatory membership in
the bar, provided that mandatory dues were not used to support cer-
tain political and ideological activities. For some, this positivist ap-
proach settles the issue: the Supreme Court has spoken and further
talk of rights violations is frivolous.'4 To many lawyers, however, the
unified bar would remain a burr even if it engaged in no political ac-
tivity whatsoever, and even though these lawyers might happily join
the same organization on a voluntary basis.' 85 To some, the very idea
of forced association is anathema, regardless of the nature of the as-
sociation. To others, forced association is distasteful because of the
association's political beliefs, even if their dues are not expended on
the political activity.
Lawyers who object to a state bar's advocacy of positions with
which they disagree are unlikely to be mollified by a small dues deduc-
tion. It seems clear that the gravamen of dissenting lawyers' com-
plaints comes not from the dollar support which they must give to
positions they oppose, but from a more deeply rooted opposition to
being forcibly linked with positions of the state bar through compul-
sory membership.'8
The unified bar has generally responded to this complaint by argu-
ing that dissenting members remain free to express their views individ-
ually, and the public does not presume that all members agree with
the bar's official position.'8 But surely this response misses the point.
The fact is, lawyers are compelled to associate with those whom they
may prefer not to associate, and are linked in the minds of many to
views they do not espouse.
No one would seriously suggest that if lawyers were forced to join
the Ku Klux Klan as a condition of practice, their concerns about
forced association would be insignificant because they could individu-
ally dissent from Klan positions. Conceding that state bar associations
are less odious to most people than the Ku Klux Klan does not elimi-
nate the sense of invasion felt by those lawyers who would prefer not
to link themselves to their state bar association. 88
184. See, e.g., Charne, supra note 132.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
186. See Smith, supra note 7, at II (District of Columbia Bar members objecting to the
District's unified bar filing an amicus brief in antitrust litigation received a dues rebate of 15
cents.).
187. See, e.g., Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 342 N.W.2d 504, 513, cert. denied 469 U.S. 925
(1984) (Folk 11).
188. One can articulate reasons for forced bar membership (though they lack merit), but it is
virtually impossible to articulate a rationale for forcing lawyers to join the Klan. The point here
is not on the claimed benefit to the state, but on the individual harm to attorneys. If the Klan
seems too strong or remote an example, imagine how angry most would feel if forced to join
Operation Rescue, the National Rifle Association, or even Common Cause.
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For lawyers, the traditional defenders of individual liberties, to
force colleagues into an association they would prefer not to join,
seems incongruous at best and hypocritical at worst. There are still
idealistic women and men graduating from American law schools, and
many will not readily accept such conscription. Even those who see
nothing wrong with forced membership in the bar must come to grips
with these deeply held beliefs of their colleagues. Insistence on perpet-
uating the unified bar will remain a source of controversy and division
within the legal profession.
V. CONCLUSIOrN
Today, eighty years after Herbert Harley began the unification
movement, 8 9 arguments for its continued existence ring surprisingly
hollow. Few, if any, seriously argue that legal services are more af-
fordable or available, that lawyers are better trained, the public better
protected from malpractice, that justice is better served, or that attor-
neys or the legal system have a higher degree of prestige, legitimacy,
or professionalism, in mandatory bar states, than in states which op-
erate with voluntary bar associations.
Further, against the lack of visible advantages, there are obvious
disadvantages to the unified bar. Keller limits the scope of activities a
unified bar can address, while increasing the administrative burdens
on the bar and promoting conflict rather than compromise. The Flor-
ida solution, adopted in Florida and Michigan, further restricts the
bar from addressing public issues that lawyers would otherwise be en-
titled to and should address, which voluntary bar associations in other
states do address, and on which the public may benefit from the
knowledge or expertise of lawyers. Under Keller, the Bar is required
to maintain a complicated rebate and arbitration procedure to refund
dues to dissenting members. The unified bar is subjected to, and its
activities restricted by, greater public oversight than that faced by vol-
untary associations. That oversight, however, is not linked to any per-
ceived public benefit, but to protecting the rights of the bar's captive
members.
Finally, the unified bar is a constant source of friction between
those lawyers who want out of the association and those who would
force them to remain. Unified bar associations in Michigan,'9 New
189. Rector, supra note 6, at 767.
190. Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 305 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1981) (Falk I); Falk v. State Bar of
Mich., 342 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1984) (Falk H1).
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Mexico,' 9 1 Wisconsin,'9 the District of Columbia, 193 and Florida'9
have all seen struggles for a decade or more within the profession over
the ability of the bar to coerce and use member dues. Numerous other
state bar associations have faced court challenges and regular infight-
ing over the insistence of some lawyers on forcing their colleagues to
belong to the bar. 95
It was once argued that while unification might meet initial resis-
tance, once it became an accomplished fact it would be readily ac-
cepted by lawyers. 9' This has not come true. To many attorneys, it
seems, the unified bar represents a betrayal of the historical role of
lawyers. As the United States District Court for New Mexico noted in
Popejoy v. New Mexico Board of Bar Commissioners,'g7 lawyers have
a special obligation to support the rights of individual conscience and
choice. Forced membership in the state bar, regardless of its constitu-
tionality, is contrary to this obligation and to the bar's heritage.
Lawyers have historically been the champions of individualism, free
speech, and free association in America. The dogged insistence of law-
yers such as Trayton Lathrop and Allan Falk to enforce these rights,
and the corresponding protections recognized by the Supreme Court
in Keller, have rendered the unified bar both ungovernable and inef-
fective at an unacceptable price. It is no longer sufficient to argue that
the Keller decision, though restricting the use of mandatory dues, up-
held the basic validity of a unified bar. Whether one argues from first
principles, or takes the unified bar on its own utilitarian terms, a re-
turn to a voluntary bar is in the best interests of both lawyers and the
public.
191. Arrow v. Dow, 636 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1983); Popejoy v. New Mexico Bd. of Bar
Comm'rs, 831 F. Supp. 814 (D.N.M. 1993);
192. See Schneyer, supra note 3; Levine, supra note 7; Charne, supra note 132.
193. On Petition to Amend Rule 1 of the Rules Governing the Bar, 431 A.2d 521 (D.C.
1981).
194. Gibson v. The Fla. Bar, 906 F. 2d 624 (11th Cir. 1990); Gibson v. The Fla. Bar, 798
F.2d 1564 (1lth Cir. 1986).
195. See cases cited supra notes 35, 38; Smith, supra note 7.
196. Schneyer, supra note 3, at 3.
197. 831 F. Supp. 814 (D.N.M. 1993).
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